class syntax_plugin_bold extends DokuWiki_Syntax_Plugin {
// common plugin functions ommited
function connectTo($mode) {
$this->Lexer->addSpecialPattern('!!!.*?!!!',$mode,'plugin_bold');
}
function handle($match, $state, $pos, &$handler){
return array(substring($match,3,-3));
}
function render($mode, &$R, $data) {
if($mode != 'xhtml') return false;
$R->doc .= ''.$data[0].'';
}
}
As you can see, the raw input data captured in the lexer pattern is just passed on to the render method, where no escaping at all is done. Malicious users could introduce what ever JavaScript and HTML code they want.
The fix is simple: proper escaping.
class syntax_plugin_bold extends DokuWiki_Syntax_Plugin {
// common plugin functions ommited
function connectTo($mode) {
$this->Lexer->addSpecialPattern('!!!.*?!!!',$mode,'plugin_bold');
}
function handle($match, $state, $pos, &$handler){
return array(substring($match,3,-3));
}
function render($mode, &$R, $data) {
if($mode != 'xhtml') return false;
$R->doc .= ''.htmlspecialchars($data[0]).'';
}
}
=== Forms ===
When your plugin provides a form it is very common to validate the input and redisplay the form with the received user input when a validation error occurs.
Example: The following shows a form vulenerable to an XSS attack because it does not escape the user provided input correctly:
Providing ''%%">%%'' as user input would exploit the vulnerability.
To fix the form use the [[phpfn>htmlspecialchars]] function:
=== Classes and other Attributes ===
Often plugins will accept multiple parameters and options that are used to modify the output of the plugin.
Imagine a plugin accepting the following input to display a message box:
Do not believe anything!
In the render method there might be code like this:
$renderer->doc .= ''.htmlspecialchars($message).'';
As you can see the message itself is properly escaped, but the class is not. Instead of escaping it might be more sensible to use a whitelist of allowed classes instead:
$allowed = array('notice','info','warning','error');
if(!in_array($class,$allowed){
$class = 'notice'; //unknown input, fall back to a sane default
}
$renderer->doc .= ''.htmlspecialchars($message).'';
=== URLs ===
When a plugin accepts URLs as input you need to make sure, users can not pass the ''%%javascript://%%'' pseudo protocol.
Here is an example how a very simple check could look like, to make sure only http and https URLs are used.
if(!preg_match('/^https?:\/\//i',$url)) $url = ''; // empty URL on protocol mismatch
===== Remote Code Inclusion =====
This attack allows an attacker to inject (PHP) code into your application. This may occur on including files, or using unsafe operations functions like [[phpfn>eval]] or [[phpfn>system]].
**Always filter any input** that will be used to load files or that is passed as an argument to external commands.
===== Information leaks =====
This attack may lead to the exposure of files that should usually be protected by DokuWiki's ACL or it might expose files on the server (like ''/etc/passwd'').
**Always filter any input** that will be used to load files or that is passed as an argument to external commands.
**Always use DokuWiki's ACL check functions when accessing page data**.
===== SQL injection =====
This attack is rarely relevant in DokuWiki because no database is used. However if your plugin accesses a database always escape all values before using them in SQL statements.
More info:
* [[wp>SQL injection]]
===== Reporting Security Issues =====
If you encounter an issue with a plugin please inform the author of the plugin via email.
Additionally a ''securityissue'' field with a short description of the problem should be added to the [[plugins:repository|data]] on the page of the plugin. This will create a red warning box and will delist the plugin from the main plugin list.
Once the issue was fixed and a new release was made, this field should be removed again.